Real Personal Uncertainty Induced by Means of Task-Related Feedback:      Effects on Reactions to Voice and            No-Voice Procedures by unknown
Real Personal Uncertainty Induced by Means
of Task-Related Feedback: Effects on Reactions
to Voice and No-Voice Procedures
Marjolein Maas • Kees van den Bos
Published online: 2 June 2011
 The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Building and extending on research on uncertainty management and
voice and no-voice procedures, we examine how real personal uncertainty moder-
ates the way in which people react to getting or being denied an opportunity to voice
one’s opinions about decisions to be made. Specifically, results of two experiments
show that conditions in which participants receive task-related feedback that
induces personal uncertainty (versus conditions that produce more personal cer-
tainty) lead to stronger effects of voice and especially no-voice procedures on
participants’ procedural fairness judgments (Experiments 1 and 2). Findings also
reveal that in these conditions stronger effects of voice and particularly no-voice
procedures can be found on participants’ anger about the way they have been
treated, especially when participants are predisposed to react in intense terms to
affect-related events (Experiment 2). Implications for the literature on uncertainty
management and the social psychology of voice and no-voice procedures are
discussed.
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The norms and values of fairness and justice play a vital role in various social
settings. It is not surprising, therefore, that the issue of fairness and justice has
received a lot of attention from scholars from a variety of disciplines, such as
philosophy, sociology, political sciences, economics, and psychology (see, e.g.,
Beauchamp, 2001; Cohen, 1986). Within social psychology and other disciplines, it
is shown convincingly that the experience of fair and unfair events may strongly
influence people’s subsequent reactions (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman,
1997; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). These findings suggest that
perceived fairness plays an important role in social behavior. It is, therefore,
important to examine when fairness matters to people (Folger, 1984; Tyler, 1990).
In the present article, we will focus on this question.
How fair and unfair events may influence people’s subsequent reactions can be
illustrated by research studies in which it is manipulated whether people are allowed
or withheld an opportunity to voice their opinions about decisions to be made (see,
e.g., Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Van den Bos, 1999;
Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004). In
general, these studies show that people judge situations in which they are allowed to
voice their opinions to be fairer than situations in which they are not allowed an
opportunity to voice their opinions. This effect is called ‘‘the voice effect’’ (Folger,
1977).
Research done within the contexts pertaining to human task behavior shows that
voice effects especially occur if people are given or denied the opportunity to voice
their opinions before decisions are actually made (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990).
Furthermore, findings have frequently shown ‘‘fair process effects.’’ For instance, it
has been found that people are less likely to protest when they have experienced fair
as opposed to unfair procedures (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988), or that people are less
angry after experiencing fair procedures (such as voice procedures) as opposed to
unfair procedures (such as no-voice procedures; see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001a).
Thus, there now is a substantial body of research showing that voice and
experienced procedural fairness can have strong effects on people’s beliefs,
attitudes, feelings, and behaviors (for overviews, see, e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld,
1996; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988; Tyler et al.,
1997).
To understand the frequently replicated voice and fair process effects, several
reviews of the literature have suggested that the underlying psychological
mechanisms should be studied more carefully (see, e.g., Folger & Cropanzano,
1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos &
Lind, 2002). One way of doing this is to focus on why fairness matters to people,
more specifically examining the conditions under which people show strong
reactions to fair and unfair events (see, e.g., Tyler, 1990; Van den Bos, 2001a; Van
den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos & Maas, in press). Van den Bos and Lind
(2002, 2009) argue in their uncertainty management model that people especially
like to be treated in fair manners when they are uncertain about themselves, and that
individuals find unfair treatment particularly aversive when they are uncertain about
themselves. In short, the model suggests that when people are uncertain about
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themselves they will react especially strongly to fair and unfair events (such as
voice and no-voice procedures) (for more extensive reviews of the uncertainty
management model, see, e.g., Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2009; Van
den Bos & Lind, 2002, 2009; see also Loseman, Miedema, Van den Bos, &
Vermunt, 2009; Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009).
Personal Uncertainty
Thus, the uncertainty management model proposes that personal uncertainty is an
important moderator of voice and fair process effects, and that studying the effects
of this moderator may help to further insights into processes leading to voice and
other fairness effects (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002, 2009). Furthermore, building on
various social psychological theories (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Hogg & Mullin, 1999;
Lopes, 1987; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986; Weary & Jacobson, 1997; Weary,
Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001), the uncertainty management model argues that
people have a fundamental need to feel certain about the world they live in and
about their place in the world, that personal uncertainty can be threatening, and that
people generally feel the urge to find a way to deal with their uncertainties (for
extensive reviews of the uncertainty management model, see Lind & Van den Bos,
2002; Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos, Martin, & Stapel, 2010; Van den Bos &
Lind, 2002, 2009).
There are different types of uncertainties that people can encounter (Van den Bos
& Lind, 2002). One noteworthy type of uncertainty that people often face when
forming social judgments is informational uncertainty, which involves having less
information available than one ideally would like to have to form a social judgment
in a confident manner (see, e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Phelps,
1970). In the current article, we will focus on another type of uncertainty that we
believe is very important when studying why fairness matters to people (Van den
Bos & Lind, 2009): personal uncertainty.
There are different definitions of personal uncertainty in the literature (see, e.g.,
De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, 2009).
Personal uncertainty, as we conceive of it, involves the implicit and explicit feelings
people experience as a result of being uncertain about themselves, comprising for
example uncertainties about their self-image, personal attitudes, aspirations, beliefs,
emotions, or self-knowledge. We define personal uncertainty as the subjective sense
of doubt or instability in people’s self-views, world-views, or the interrelation
between the two (Van den Bos, 2001a, 2007, 2009; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas,
Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). Furthermore, we assume that experiencing
personal uncertainty is a hot-cognitive social psychological process (Abelson,
1963), involving a combination of both cognitive and affective reactions (Van den
Bos, 2007). We also think that personal uncertainty more often than not involves
visceral and intuitive (instead of more reasoned and rationalistic) reactions (Maas &
Van den Bos, 2009). Experiencing personal uncertainty about one’s attitudes,
beliefs, feelings, and perceptions, as well as about one’s relationship to other people,
is generally aversive (e.g., Hogg, 2007), and personal uncertainty therefore often
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motivates behavior that seeks to reduce it. Although experiencing personal
uncertainty may sometimes be sought out (e.g., Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson,
& Hewitt, 1988) and occasionally may instigate contemplation or introspection
(e.g., Weary & Jacobson, 1997), we argue that it is more common for people to find
experiencing personal uncertainty an alarming or aversive event that does not allow
for contemplation and introspection, but requires people to respond rather quickly to
what is going on (Van den Bos et al., 2008).
In the literature on personal uncertainty, it is often argued that people have a
drive to reduce their personal uncertainties (e.g., Berger & Calabrese, 1975). The
way in which people deal with or manage their personal uncertainties may differ.
For example, work by McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) shows that
people manage their personal uncertainties by compensatory conviction about
unrelated attitudes and values. Work by Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, and
Maas (2007) reveals that personal uncertainty is an important determinant of how
people react to socially deviating persons. The findings show that thinking about
personal uncertainty as well as higher scores on a dimension measuring the extent to
which uncertainty is considered to be an emotional threatening experience, lead
people to mentally and physically distance themselves more from socially deviating
people.
Related to this, Van den Bos (2001a) showed that when people have been
thinking about their personal uncertainties, they react more strongly when they are
being treated in fair versus unfair manners than when they have not been thinking
about their personal uncertainties. Thus, when people’s personal uncertainties have
been made salient to them, fairness seems to matter especially to people, and fair
events are much appreciated and unfair events are much hated. The net result is that
conditions in which people’s personal uncertainties are salient tend to produce
stronger voice effects, stronger fair process effects, and stronger other fairness and
cultural worldview effects (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001a; Van den Bos et al., 2005;
Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009).
The Current Research
Although thinking of situations in which a person felt uncertain about him or herself
may make personal uncertainty more accessible (Van den Bos, 2001a; Van den Bos
et al., 2005; Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009), these studies (or any other published
study known to us) do not reveal direct evidence that actually experienced
uncertainty moderates peoples’ fairness reactions. Therefore, we would like to
extend the current research on uncertainty effects in the current paper and take it a
step further. We would like to do this by focusing on how people react to voice and
no-voice procedures when they have been confronted with real instances of personal
uncertainty, as opposed to merely making personal uncertainty more accessible (cf.
Van den Bos, 2001a; Van den Bos et al., 2005; Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009) or
studying informational uncertainty as a moderator of justice judgments (cf. See,
2009; Thau, Bennett, Mitchell, & Marrs, 2009).
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As we know from the social justice literature, voice and procedural fairness are
important in task-related settings (e.g., Lind et al., 1990). Furthermore, receiving
negative feedback about one’s task performance may lead people to become
uncertain about their performance capabilities, which may cause job-related
uncertainty (Van den Bos, Heuven, Burger, & Ferna´ndez Van Veldhuizen, 2006).
We argue, therefore, that university students as research participants will feel
uncertain about themselves when they cannot live up to their own expectations
about performing well on simple tasks while they see others are able to complete
quite easily. Thus, building on the uncertainty management hypothesis studied here,
we propose that these research participants will react stronger to variations in
procedure (voice vs. no voice), compared to participants who performed well on the
tasks and hence would not feel uncertain about themselves.
In order to test this hypothesis, we present two experiments. In these
experiments, we attempted to induce feelings of personal uncertainty by means of
task-related feedback. We did this in the context of task-relevant behavior, in which
receiving voice is important (Lind et al., 1990). As mentioned before, self-
knowledge about one’s own capabilities and knowing that one is correct are
important to people (Festinger, 1954; Sorrentino, Brouwers, Hanna, & Roney, 1996;
Sorrentino & Roney, 1986, 2000; Swann, 1990). Furthermore, people like to
perform well on tests, like for example brain teasers and problem-solving tasks, and
certainly when they perceive them to be a good measure of their ability and the tests
are not too difficult. Getting feedback then that one in fact did poorly on an
important and doable task creates confusion about one’s ability and anxiety over
failure. In short, negative performance feedback may cause feelings of personal
uncertainty (e.g., Sorrentino et al., 1996; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000). Therefore, in
both experiments reported we will induce feelings of personal uncertainty by means
of task performance feedback.
Experiment 1
In both the experiments to be presented in this article, feelings of personal
uncertainty are induced before procedural justice was manipulated. To operation-
alize our manipulation of personal uncertainty, we will take advantage of the fact
that our participants all are university students who generally hold the opinion that
they should be able to perform well on relative simple tasks that have a diagnostic
character regarding their intelligence. Being told that they have no aptitude for the
tasks, or knowing that other people outperform them may cause them to doubt their
own abilities causing feelings of personal uncertainty (see, e.g., Festinger, 1954;
Sorrentino et al., 1996; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; Swann, 1990). To check that
being in such a situation the task-related feedback they receive indeed will cause
them to feel uncertain, our manipulation checks will ask participants whether they
feel uncertain in this situation.1 The procedure manipulation consisted of a widely
1 In both Experiments 1 and 2, we also measured social and performance state self-esteem (Heatherton &
Polivy, 1991; as [ 0.89) in order to make sure that our manipulation of personal uncertainty indeed
Soc Just Res (2011) 24:107–125 111
123
accepted and often examined manipulation of procedure: participants either did or
did not receive an opportunity to voice their opinion about a decision that had to be
made in the experiment (see, e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Folger, 1977; Van den Bos,
1999; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999).
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and forty-five students (39 men and 106 women) at Utrecht University
participated in the experiment, and were paid €4 for their participation. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (personal uncertainty:
uncertain vs. certain) 9 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design.
Experimental Procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory to participate in a study on how people
perform computer tasks. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to
separate cubicles, each of which contained a computer, monitor, and keyboard.
Participants were informed that all computers were connected to one another and
that communication with them could take place by means of the computer network.
All further instructions were presented on the computer screens. The computers
were used to present the stimulus information and to collect data on the dependent
variables and manipulation checks.
Participants were informed that they were about to do a 10-min computer task in
which their reaction times to given problems would be measured. Participants were
also told that others generally experienced the computer task as a simple task. They
were further informed that the purpose of the study was to investigate the quickness
and accuracy with which people are able to solve the problems in this task. Then,
participants read detailed instructions of the task. It was explained to the participants
to keep their hands above the keyboard throughout the task, such that their left and
right index fingers were above the ‘‘x’’ and ‘‘.’’ keys, respectively, and their left and
right middle fingers were above the ‘‘z’’ and ‘‘/’’ keys, respectively. During the task,
four blank circles appeared in a quadrangle on participants’ computer screens. After
1 s, randomly one of the circles turned black for 2 s. Participants were asked to
indicate as quickly as possible which circle turned black by pressing the correspond-
ing key on the keyboard such that, if one of the two inner circles turned black they had
to respond with the corresponding index finger. If one of the two outer circles turned
black, they had to respond with their opposite middle finger (i.e., if the left outer circle
turned black they had to respond with their right middle finger and vice versa). After
Footnote 1 continued
induced feelings of uncertainty and not simply lowered self-esteem. Findings obtained in both experi-
ments did not show significant main effects nor interaction effects on these widely used and reliable state
self-esteem scales. We did find, as reported in the ‘‘Results’’ sections, that participants reported more
feelings of personal uncertainty in the uncertain compared to the certain conditions. Therefore, we
conclude that in both Experiments 1 and 2 feelings of personal uncertainty were induced as intended.
112 Soc Just Res (2011) 24:107–125
123
participants had pressed a key or when they did not press a key for 2 s, the circles
disappeared and a new set of four circles appeared on the screen.
After reading these instructions, participants were given the opportunity to
practice the task. To ensure comprehension of the task, in the practice round the
correct response was disclosed when participants pressed the wrong key. The
practice round was followed by the 10-min work round. After completing the work
round, participants were given a score that was supposedly based on how quickly
they had responded and on the amount of mistakes they had made (actually all
participants received a score of ‘‘17.36’’). In the instructions, it was communicated
to the participants that the lower their score would be, the better their performance.
However, participants were not told how high or low their scores possibly could be.
Thus, actually, participants did not know how well they scored on the task.
Receiving this ambiguous score was directly followed by the manipulation of
personal uncertainty induced by task performance feedback. As mentioned, we were
interested in the feelings of personal uncertainty evoked by participants’ knowledge
that they performed either poorly or good on a simple task. Therefore, in the
condition in which we tried to make participants to feel uncertain about themselves
and their task scores, participants read that their performance was very bad
compared to the general norm, that they belonged to the 7% that performed worst on
the task, and that 93% of the participants outperformed them on the task. In the
condition in which we tried to make participants to feel certain about themselves,
participants read that their performance was very good compared to the general
norm, that they belonged to the 7% that performed best on the task, and that 93% of
the participants performed worse on the task.
To ensure comprehension of this manipulation, participants were subsequently
asked to indicate on dichotomous scales whether the task was in general experienced
as a simple task or not, whether they belonged to the 7% that performed worst or best,
whether 93% of the participants scored better or worse than they did, and whether
their performance was very bad or very good compared to the general norm. All
participants answered these questions correctly. Furthermore, to check whether
feelings of personal uncertainty and certainty were induced by task performance
feedback, participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the
following questions (all measured on 7-point Likert-type scales, 1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree): ‘‘At this moment I am uncertain about my ability to
perform well on this task’’; ‘‘At this moment I doubt my ability to perform well on this
task’’; ‘‘At this moment I am uncertain about whether I am able to solve the given
problems well’’; ‘‘At this moment I doubt whether I am able to solve the given
problems well’’; ‘‘At this moment I am uncertain about whether I performed well on
this task’’; ‘‘At this moment I doubt whether I performed well on this task’’. All six
questions were combined to form a reliable scale to check for feelings of task-related
personal uncertainty (a = 0.90).
After this, the procedure that participants received was manipulated. In the voice
condition, participants were informed that the experimenter was interested in their
opinions about a second task that would be the same as the first task and which they
had to do at the end of the experiment. Therefore, they were asked to voice their
opinions about whether they thought the second task was necessary and whether
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they would participate in the second task when given the opportunity. In the
no-voice condition, participants were informed that the experimenter was not
interested in their opinions about the second task and they were explicitly not given
the opportunity to voice their opinions about whether they thought the second task
was necessary and whether they would perform the second task when given the
opportunity.
The procedure manipulation was followed by measuring procedural fairness
judgments and the manipulation checks of procedure. All ratings were made on
7-point scales. Participants’ procedural fairness judgments were assessed by asking
them how fair (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair), just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very
just), appropriate (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate), and justified
(1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) they considered the way they were treated.
These four items were averaged to form a reliable scale for procedural fairness
judgments (a = 0.92). To check whether the procedure manipulation was induced
as intended, participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the following
statement: ‘‘The experimenter was interested in my opinions’’ (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). This was followed by a careful debriefing in which
participants were informed about the purposes of the study and the fictitious
feedback they received during the experiment.
Results
Manipulation Checks
A 2 9 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that checked for feelings of task-
related personal uncertainty yielded only a main effect of the uncertainty manipu-
lation, F(1,141) = 9.56, P \ 0.01, g2 = 0.06. Participants in the uncertain condition
experienced more feelings of uncertainty (M = 2.94, SD = 1.29) than participants in
the certain condition (M = 2.35, SD = 0.98). This shows that our manipulation was
successful in evoking feelings of task-related personal uncertainty.
A 2 9 2 ANOVA on the question that checked for the procedure manipulation
yielded only a main effect of procedure, F(1,141) = 171.09, P \ 0.001, g2 = 0.55,
indicating that participants in the voice condition agreed more strongly that the
experimenter was interested in their opinions (M = 5.49, SD = 1.64) than
participants in the no-voice condition (M = 1.95, SD = 1.63). Therefore, we can
conclude that our procedure manipulation was successfully induced.
Procedural Fairness Judgments
A 2 9 2 ANOVA on the scale of participants’ procedural fairness judgments
yielded a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 141) = 97.26, P \ 0.001,
g2 = 0.41, indicating that participants found voice procedures to be more fair
(M = 5.25, SD = 0.90) than no-voice procedures (M = 3.77, SD = 0.92). This
effect was qualified by the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 141) = 6.07, P = 0.01,
g2 = 0.04. As expected, the effects of the procedure manipulation was stronger in
the uncertain condition, F(1,143) = 61.39, P \ 0.001, g2 = 0.30, than in the
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certain condition, F(1, 143) = 18.52, P \ 0.001, g2 = 0.11. The results also
indicated that participants in the no-voice condition found the procedures used less
fair when they experienced uncertainty than when they experienced certainty, F(1,
143) = 5.08, P = 0.03, g2 = 0.03. There were no such effects in the voice
condition (see Fig. 1).
Discussion
As predicted, participants reacted more strongly toward variations in voice
procedures when they experienced task-induced personal uncertainty compared to
participants who did not experience personal uncertainty. In other words, we
replicated the voice effect (Folger, 1977) such that participants indicated that they
thought the procedures were more fair when they had received an opportunity to
voice their opinion than when they were denied that opportunity. Furthermore, the
voice effect was especially strong in conditions in which personal uncertainty was
induced by means of performance feedback. Specifically, participants in the
condition in which they performed badly and hence felt relatively uncertain about
themselves judged the no-voice procedure to be more unfair, compared to
participants in the condition in which they performed well and thus did not
experience personal uncertainty to a great extent. Thus, the findings of Experiment 1
provide supportive evidence for our line of reasoning that real personal uncertainty
induced by task-related feedback influences fairness perceptions of voice and
especially no-voice procedures. But before drawing strong conclusions on the basis
of these results, it is important to replicate them in a second experiment.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tried to evoke feelings of uncertainty in an even more natural



















Fig. 1 Participants’ procedural fairness judgments as a function of personal uncertainty and procedure
(Experiment 1)
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was induced by giving university students feedback that a comparable other person
was much better (versus equally competent) in performing intelligent or brain-
teasing tasks. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we assessed our manipulation check of
induced personal uncertainty at the end of the experiment, instead of in-between the
uncertainty and procedure manipulations as we did in Experiment 1. In this way, we
ruled out the possibility that measuring feelings of task-related personal uncertainty
in-between the manipulations might have interfered with our manipulations and
their effects.
In addition to measuring procedural fairness judgments as our dependent
variable, we also examined whether our predicted effects could be found on
people’s affective reactions to the way they had been treated in the experiment.
Specifically, as we know from the fairness literature, giving or withholding people
an opportunity to voice their opinions can result in fair process effects such that, for
instance, people are less angry after experiencing fair procedures instead of unfair
ones (Van den Bos, 2001a; see also Folger et al., 1979; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Weiss
et al., 1999). Thus, we will assess how angry our participants are about the way they
have been treated.
Moreover, it has been suggested that predispositions in how people react to
affect-related events (Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986) can moderate people’s
reactions to fair and unfair events (Van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003).
Thus, voice and fair process effects are supposed to be stronger for people who tend
to react in strong affective terms to positive or negative events than for people who
show mild or less intense affective reactions to events. Combining this insight with
the hypotheses tested in Experiment 1, we will test in Experiment 2 the prediction
that especially when people experience personal uncertainty, differences in affect
intensity (Larsen et al., 1986) will moderate people’s reactions to perceived fairness
(Van den Bos et al., 2003; see also Maas & Van den Bos, 2009).
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred twenty-three students (28 men and 95 women) at Utrecht University
participated in the experiment, receiving course credits for their participation. Two
weeks prior to the experiment participants filled out the affect intensity measure
(AIM; Larsen et al., 1986). Examples of items from the AIM are ‘‘When I’m happy,
I bubble over with energy’’ and ‘‘My negative moods are mild in intensity’’. All
ratings were made on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = never, 7 = always; a = 0.82).
At arrival at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
conditions of a 2 (personal uncertainty: uncertain vs. certain) 9 2 (procedure: voice
vs. no voice) factorial design.
Experimental Procedure
Participants (one at a time) were seated on a chair at a table facing a female
confederate (referred to as ‘‘Other’’). The experimenter seated herself on a chair at
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the side of the table and read the instructions out loud. Participants were told that
they would be asked to complete a test consisting of problem-solving tasks. They
were further informed that this test constituted a validated measure of flexibility of
the mind and intelligence. Participants were asked to solve as many problems during
the completion of the problem-solving tasks as quickly and accurately as possible.
The importance of the tasks was stressed by telling participants that the tasks
measured important characteristics for academic success. The better participants
would score on the test, the more of these important characteristics they supposedly
would possess. It was further emphasized that the tasks in general were considered
to be simple and doable. Participants and Other were then informed that they would
both perform tasks in three rounds: two 90 s practice rounds that were followed by a
6-min main working round. Within all rounds participants were given different
kinds of brain-teasing problems to solve. After checking that the participants
understood the instructions, the first practice round started.
After this round, personal uncertainty was manipulated by means of task-
related feedback. This was done both in the second practice round and in
the main working round. In the uncertain condition, Other worked faster in the
second practice round, solving more problems in the given 90 s. Then, in the
main working round participants and Other were given an amount of brain
teasers that could not be solved in the given time and Other solved the given
problems more quickly than the participant did. In the certain condition, Other
worked equally fast in the second practice round, solving approximately an equal
amount of problems in the given 90 s. Then, in the main working round,
participants and Other were given an amount of brain teasers that could be
solved in the given time and Other worked equally fast as the participants
throughout the entire task.
Next, participants and Other were informed they had to do another task in
separate rooms and Other was taken to another room. Then, the experimenter asked
the participants to take a seat behind the computer. The experimenter explained that
the computer was connected to a network through which communication could take
place. All further instructions were presented on the computer screen. The
computers were used to present the procedure stimulus information and to collect
data on the dependent variables and manipulation checks. After the experimenter
left the room, the procedure manipulation was induced in the same way as in
Experiment 1. The manipulation of procedure was followed by questions measuring
participants’ procedural fairness judgments, anger participants experienced as a
result of the procedure, and the manipulation checks. All ratings were made on
7-point Likert-type scales. The same procedural fairness judgments were measured
as in Experiment 1 (a = 0.94). Similar to earlier studies (Van den Bos et al., 2005),
the anger participants held toward the procedures used were assessed by asking
participants to what extent they felt angry, furious, and enraged about the way they
had been treated (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). These items were averaged to
form a reliable anger index (a = 0.92).
At the end of the experiment, we assessed our manipulation checks. To check
whether participants felt uncertain or certain, they were asked the same six
questions as in Experiment 1 plus the following two questions: ‘‘If you think about
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the way you have performed yourself on these tasks, to what extent do you become
uncertain?’’ (1 = absolutely not, 7 = completely), and ‘‘If you think about the way
Other has performed on these tasks, to what extent do you become uncertain?’’
(1 = absolutely not, 7 = completely). All eight uncertainty questions were
combined to form a reliable scale of feelings of uncertainty (a = 0.93). The
manipulation of procedure was checked in the same way as in Experiment 1. This
was followed by a careful debriefing about the purposes of the study and the
feedback participants received during the experiment.
Results
In all analyses, we regressed the manipulation checks or dependent variables on
AIM, personal uncertainty, and procedure, testing for all main effects and all
interactions. Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we centralized
the continuous AIM variable and effect-coded the variables pertaining to the
uncertainty and procedure manipulations.
Manipulation Checks
As expected, on the scale that checked for feelings of personal uncertainty we found
a significant main effect of the uncertainty manipulation, b = -0.23, t(115) =
-2.55, P = 0.01, indicating that participants in the uncertain condition experienced
more feelings of uncertainty (M = 3.57, SD = 1.36) than participants in the certain
condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.11). Thus, similar to Experiment 1, we found reliable
effects of our uncertainty manipulation on participants’ feelings of personal
uncertainty, independently from the other manipulated variable (procedure). We
further found that participants’ feelings of uncertainty were related to participants’
scores on the affect intensity measure. That is, we found a main effect of AIM,
b = 0.21, t(115) = 2.25, P = 0.03, indicating that when participants scored higher
on the affect intensity measure, they reported to feel more uncertain. This result is
not unexpected, since we know from the literature that affect intensity especially
evokes divergent reactions for people high and low in affect intensity in response to
situations containing affective stimuli (Larsen & Diener, 1987; Van den Bos et al.,
2003). In line with this observation, we also found an interaction effect between
personal uncertainty and AIM, b = 0.21 t(115) = 2.25, P = 0.03, indicating that in
the uncertain condition participants reported more feelings of task-related personal
uncertainty when their affect intensity scores were higher, b = 0.30, t(61) = 2.49,
P = 0.02, whereas there was no such effect in the certain condition, b = 0.06,
t(58) = 0.47, ns.
As expected, the question that checked for the procedure manipulation showed a
significant main effect of procedure, b = 0.68, t(115) = 10.14, P \ 0.001,
indicating that participants in the voice condition though that the experimenter
was more interested in their opinions (M = 4.94, SD = 1.42) than participants in
the no-voice condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.07). This effect was not moderated by
the other independent variables.
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Procedural Fairness Judgments
Participants’ procedural fairness judgments yielded a significant main effect of
procedure, b = 0.49, t(115) = 6.93, P \ 0.001, a significant main effect of AIM,
b = -0.35, t(115) = -4.72, P \ 0.001, and a significant two-way interaction
between AIM and procedure, b = 0.31, t(115) = 4.24, P \ 0.001. These effects
were qualified by the predicted three-way interaction effect, b = -0.15,
t(115) = -2.09, P = 0.04. Figure 2 illustrates these effects.
To get a better insight into the three-way interaction effect, we conducted two-
way regression analyses in both the uncertain and certain conditions. In the
uncertain condition this yielded a significant main effect of procedure, b = 0.39,
t(59) = 3.72, P \ 0.001, indicating that participants judged the procedure to be
more fair when they received voice (M = 5.58, SD = 1.10) than when they did not
receive voice (M = 4.55, SD = 1.27). Moreover, this effect was qualified by a
significant two-way interaction effect, b = 0.42, t(59) = 3.91, P \ 0.001, indicat-
ing that especially when participants scored higher on AIM, not receiving an
opportunity to voice their opinion was judged to be less fair, b = -0.58, t(28) =
-3.80, P = 0.001. No significant simple effects were found for participants who did
receive voice. The left part of Fig. 2 shows these effects.
In the certain condition, we found a significant main effect of AIM, b =
-0.51, t(56) = -5.39, P \ 0.001, and a significant main effect of procedure,
b = 0.57, t(56) = 6.08, P \ 0.001, and no interaction effect. Thus, when
participants felt certain, they judged the procedures to be less fair as they scored
higher on affect intensity. Furthermore, when participants received voice they
judged the procedures to be more fair (M = 5.60, SD = 1.05) than when they did






















Fig. 2 Participants’ procedural fairness judgments as a function of affect intensity (one SD above and
below the mean), personal uncertainty, and procedure (Experiment 2)
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Anger
On the scale that measured the amount of anger participants held toward the
procedures used, we found a significant main effect of procedure, b = -0.31,
t(115) = -3.56, P \ 0.01, and a significant main effect of AIM, b = 0.20,
t(115) = 2.17, P = 0.03. These effects were qualified by the predicted three-way
interaction, b = 0.20, t(115) = 2.27, P = 0.03. Figure 3 graphs these effects.
To get a better insight into the three-way interaction, we conducted two-way
regression analyses in both the certain and uncertain conditions. In the uncertain
condition, this yielded a significant interaction effect between procedure and
personal uncertainty, b = -0.29, t(59) = -2.43, P = 0.02, indicating that partic-
ipants who felt uncertain experienced more anger after not receiving an opportunity
to voice their opinion when they scored higher on affect intensity, b = 0.45,
t(28) = 2.68, P = 0.01. No effects were found for participants who received an
opportunity to voice their opinion. The left part of Fig. 3 shows these effects. In the
certain condition, we only found a significant main effect of procedure, b = -0.38,
t(56) = -3.05, P \ 0.01. Thus, when participants were relatively certain about
their task performance, they felt less anger when they had received voice
(M = 1.45, SD = 0.76) than when they had not receive voice (M = 2.20,
SD = 1.18). The right part of Fig. 3 shows these effects.
General Discussion
Thus, as predicted, we found in Experiment 2 that especially in conditions in which
task-related feedback caused participants to experience feelings of personal
uncertainty (compared to feedback conditions in which this was not the case) that
participants showed stronger reactions to voice and especially no-voice procedures,











Fig. 3 Anger experienced toward the procedures used as a function of affect intensity (one SD above and
below the mean), personal uncertainty, and procedure (Experiment 2)
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events. This effect was found on both procedural fairness judgments and
participants’ anger against the way they had been treated.
Taken together, this article presents two studies that further develop the idea that
personal uncertainty moderates the effects of voice and especially no-voice
procedures on procedural fairness judgments and affective reactions, specifically
anger reactions. One explicit contribution of the current article is to have revealed
that task-related feedback may impact personal uncertainty and that different
feedback conditions hence may moderate reactions to voice and particularly no-
voice procedures. In this way, the present studies extend beyond earlier studies that
examined the moderating role of mere cognitive activation of the uncertainty
construct (cf. Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos, 2001a, 2001b; Van den
Bos et al., 2005) or studied the role of informational uncertainty in the fairness
judgment process (cf. See, 2009; Thau et al., 2009). Showing that real experiences
of personal uncertainty can lead to predictable responses to procedural fairness
issues lends credence to the uncertainty management model and past work in this
area (see, e.g., Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos &
Lind, 2002, 2009).
One noteworthy finding obtained in both experiments is that ‘‘the voice effect’’
we found was such that when participants were being denied voice this led to more
negative reactions, whereas the presence of voice did not necessarily led to more
positive reactions. This is a pattern that has been reported before in the research
literature (e.g., Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001),
suggesting that no-voice conditions frequently lead to more negative reactions as
opposed to voice conditions lead to more positive judgments (see also Brockner &
Wiesenfeld, 1996). This implies that what typically is labeled as the ‘‘voice effect’’
(suggesting more positive judgments following voice) might actually be thought of
more properly as a ‘‘no-voice’’ effect (indicating more negative judgments
following no voice).
By building upon procedural fairness research within task behavior contexts (Lind
et al., 1990) and based on social psychological theories on uncertainty (e.g., Festinger,
1954; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986, 2000; Weary & Jacobson,
1997; Weary et al., 2001), we have induced feelings of uncertainty by task
performance feedback. In both experiments participants indicated that they felt more
task-related personal uncertainty when they had been told that they did not perform
well on the tasks in our experiments as opposed to when they did perform well. One
might wonder whether our feedback manipulations would have had an effect on other
important psychological concepts. One such concept is state self-esteem, but, as we
report in footnote 1, effects of both experiments did not reveal any effects on widely
used and reliable scales of both social and performance state self-esteem (Heatherton
& Polivy, 1991). The effects we did find, however, revealed the predicted effects on
questions measuring people’s feelings of task-related personal uncertainty. Therefore,
we would like to conclude for now that our findings provide evidence for our line of
reasoning that our manipulations of giving feedback to participants that they were not
(versus were) successful in performing important (i.e., intelligence-related) and
doable tasks lowered their feelings of personal uncertainty. Future research is needed
to examine the effects on other possible concepts. Future research may also want to
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use other possible operationalizations of real personal uncertainty and study how
these operationalizations impact reactions to fair and unfair events. For now we can
conclude that the task-related feedback that we gave our participants had predictable
effects on ratings of personal uncertainty, procedural fairness judgments, and anger
reactions, and not on state self-esteem.
We also should note here that there are important individual differences in how
people cope with uncertainty and that this can impact their reactions considerably
(see, e.g., Greco & Roger, 2001; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000). Furthermore, we know
from the literature that some uncertainties can be pleasant and engaging (Sorrentino
& Roney, 2000). It would be interesting to sort out what differential effects various
types of uncertainty might have on people’s fairness reactions. This noted, for our
line of reasoning, we attended to the more commonly experience following personal
uncertainty, which are generally aversive reactions (Hogg & Mullin, 1999;
McGregor & Marigold, 2003; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986; Van den Bos & Lind,
2002), and we showed that in task-relevant situations, personal uncertainty causes
people to react more strongly to variations in voice and especially no-voice
procedures. Future research could also study other operationalizations of voice and
no-voice procedures (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 1999) and other fairness manipulations
(see, e.g., Tyler & Smith, 1998).
In conclusion, we think it is reasonably to note that the findings of the current
research tell us something important about people’s reactions to fair and unfair
events, and especially voice and no-voice procedures. In the face of real time
experienced personal uncertainty, which can be induced by means of task-related
feedback, fairness seems to especially matters to people, and they react in
particularly positive terms to voice procedures and in especially negative terms to
no-voice procedures. This suggests that not only thinking about the uncertainties in
life (cf. Van den Bos, 2001a), but actually being confronted with performance
feedback that causes feelings of uncertainty, is an important determinant of fairness
reactions. These findings may help in the progress of understanding why voice and
no-voice procedures (being among the most important procedural fairness
encounters people can experience) matter to people.
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